This paper analyses the methods for validation of risk model and provides an overview of the present literature related to the validation and evaluation of VaR model success. The importance of validating a risk model originates from the fact that financial institutions are authorised by regulatory bodies to use in-house models for the evaluation of VaR and assess capital adequacy based on that.
INTRODUCTION
Banks encounter various forms of risk on a daily basis. In order to control, manage and measure risks, banks have been actively involved in the fi nancial risk management process. Th e risk management function contributes to better risk management within banks, through continuous measurement of risk of the current portfolio of fi nancial assets and other exposures, as well as by taking steps, either directly or in cooperation with other functions of the bank, in order to reduce the possibility of loss. From the regulator's perspective, the size and the risk of the bank's assets are one of the most important determinants for defi ning the amount of the necessary capital of the bank.
Th e globalization of the fi nancial market has led to the need for globalization of the supervision system of the fi nancial sector. Regulatory bodies are in charge of protection of the fi nancial system from catastrophic events, which could be the source of systematic risk. In the last couple of years, the central issue of risk management has been to determine the capital adequacy for fi nancial institutions in order to protect themselves against the market risk. Th e process of market risk assessment is a complex and an extremely important task for each and every credit institution. Th is increased focus on risk management has led to development of various methods and tools for risk measurement.
Financial risk management has truly undergone a revolution in the last couple of years, which has been intitated by the introduction of Value at Risk (hereinaft er: VaR), a new method for measuring market risk. In the light of the recent fi nancial crisis, the process of measuring the market risk has been drawing considerable attention and is gaining more and more importance. Th e last global fi nancial crisis has shown that the systems for management and calculation of exposure to such risks, have signifi cantly failed, and has therefore forced banks to take certain steps for the purpose of forming effi cient internal approaches and methods for market risk management. Risk managers are attempting to revise the previous methods, as they consider poor risk management one of the most important causes of the recent crisis.
Market risk appears and occurs primarily due to trade activities conducted within the bank's operations. Th is risk refers to the possibility of having the instruments in the bank's trading book suff er a decrease in value (Hull, 2012) . Th e trading book marks the positions within the business books of the bank which refer to the fi nancial instruments and the real assests. Th ese are intended for trade or hedging of other elements of the trading book and for such there are no restrictions in regard to their trade, nor restrictions for these positions to be protected against risk (Base Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009).
Th e VaR models measure the market and the price risk of securities portfolio, that is, the risk of decrease in portfolio market values, as a result of changes in the movement of interest rates, foreign currencies, prices of securities and the price of commodities. Th e VaR models encompass several components of the market risk into one quantititve measure of potential losses within the given time horizon. Th erefore, the model for the assessment of market risk is the model that
METHODs OF VALIDATING THE MODELs FOR MEASURING MARKET RISK -BACKTESTING
envisages the value at risk of the portfolio for one or several confi dence levels, during the specifi c time horizon. In practice, horizon is most oft en defi ned as one day (trading day). However, the calculation of VaR is a complex task, which includes numerous mathematical and statistical assumptions. Given that they cannot be always fulfi lled, VaR models must be subjected to the backtesting process by means of various statistical tools.
Backtesting is an important part of the VaR system. Th rough validation of the risk model, the previous effi ciency of the VaR model is tested. Both literature and practice have developed two most frequent methods of model validation, which could refer to potentital weaknesses of the VaR model (Kupiec, 1995; Christoff ersen, 1998) . One refers to the number of outliers, i.e. the number of times when the realized loss exceeds the VaR value. Th e other manner refers to the extent in which outliers have been grouped, i.e. whether in time, they have become independent. Th ere are statistical tests which can help to determine the accuracy of the VaR model and suggest whether a model should be rejected due to excessive or insuffi cient number of outliers or their frequent grouping.
One of the major disadvantages of adequate measuring of exposure to market risk in Serbian banks, regarding the securities trading activities or calculation of the currency and interest rate risk, primarily lies in insuffi cient use of internal models for risk measurement, which are based on the VaR methodology. In that sense, this paper aims to support and suggest the local banks the introduction of sophisticated internal risk models, as well as reliable techniques for validation of their accuracy and reliability when assessing market risks.
Th e paper is organized in the following way. Th e second part of the paper elaborates on the basic concept and objectives of the backtesting process, as a critical process in financial risk management and the assessment of performance of the risk models. Th e third part provides an overview of several most frequently used standard techniques and tools for VaR model validation. We shall also present the backtesting methodologies which have been proposed and developed during the last world crisis and present the latest state-ofthe-art techniques of the risk metrics validation. Th e fourth part provides a brief conclusion and recommendations for future research.
VAR MODEL VALIDATION -BACKTESTING
In the past two decades, the banks have allocated signifi cant funds and resources to development of internal risk models for the purpose of better quantifi cation of fi nancial risks and determination of the necessary economic capital. Th ese eff orts have been acknowledged and supported by regulatory bodies. Th us, the amendment to the Basel Accord from 1996 (MRA), which referred to the market risk, has formally incorporated internal banking models for market risk when calculating the regulatory capital. Th e regulatory capital requirements for exposure to market risk are exclusively the function of the bank's own VaR assessment. Th e key component in implementation of MRA was the development of standards related to validation and verifi cation of models (backtesting), which must be fulfi lled so that the bank's models could be used for the purposes of regulatory capital.
In fi nances, the term "backtesting" is used in diff erent contexts. Most oft en, backtesting implies: 1) assessment of previous performance of trading strategies, 2) assessment of the fi nancial risk model using historical data for risk forecasting and comparison with the realized return rates (Christoff ersen, 2009 ). In order to be sure of the reliability of the VaR model, it is necessary to carry out their validation. Th is further implies that back testing is the critical issue when assessing the risk model. Backtesting requires the application of quantitative, most oft en statistical methods, for the purpose of determining whether a model for risk assessment is adequate or not. Th e backtesting process can be used for three complementary purposes.
Th e fi rst objective of the backtesting process is to determine whether the assessments have come close enough to the realized outputs, in order to enable the reaching of the conclusion that such assessments are statistically compatible with the relevant outputs. Th e backtest, which has been carried out for this purpose, involves statistical testing of hypothesis, in order to determine whether the assessment models are acceptable. Th e testing of hypothesis can be applied to observations which include the loss exceeding the VaR value, for the given confi dence interval, or for the assessment of VaR for several confi dence intervals. Th e second objective of backtesting is to aid risk managers when diagnosing problems they are faced with within their risk models, so as to improve them. Th e third objective of backtesting is to rank the performances of several alternative risk models, in order to determine which model provides the best performance assessment. A good risk model should fulfi ll all of the three mentioned criteria: to pass the statistical test, it should not create any concerning diagnostics and it should be wellranked compared to the alternative methods. Th e signifi cance of backtesting is obvious: if risk managers have confi dence in their risk models, than the models should be properly tested and in such case, should provide proper results.
VaR models risk measurement are useful if providing a reasonable anticipation of risk. Th erefore, the accuracy of these models should always be verifi ed. Th is can be done in several ways, including backtesting which represents a procedure for verifying whether the actual losses are in accordance with the projected ones. Backtesting includes comparison of historical anticipation of VaR with portfolio incomes and is very important for managers, in regard to evaluation of errors made in assumptions, wrong parameters and inaccurate modelling. It is a method for comparison of daily profi ts and losses, with assessments of VaR models, for the purpose of measuring their accuracy and precision. Also, according to the Basel Accord, backtesting plays a signifi cant role in deciding on the use of bank's internal VaR model for determing the required capital (Terzić, 2014) .
If such model is correct, the number of realized losses suits the confi dence interval, i.e. if the confi dence level is 99%, then the actual loss occurred in 1 % of cases. For example, if the daily VaR is 1 million € and the confi dence interval is 99%, according to the VaR model, we can expect for the loss to be grater than 1 million € in only 1% of cases, i.e. within 2.5 days of a total of 250 working days within a year. If the number of days on which the loss exceeds 1 million, is small, equal to or somewhat greater than 2.5, the model is then correct, but if the number of days when the loss exceeds 1 million is signifi cantly greater than predicted, based on confi dence level (2.5 days), the model is than considered incorrect. Th e number of situations in which losses occur, i.e. the number of those incomes which are beyond the confi dence interval of VaR, is known as the number of outliers. In case of numerous outliers, the model has underestimated the risk (Terzić, 2014) .
In order to fi nalize the VaR model backtesting, we need a series of data which consist of estimated model values, on the one hand, and daily profi ts and losses generated by the portfolio, on the other hand. Upon collecting a series of necessary data, the following stage is approached, the preliminary data analysis. A backtesting diagram needs to be designed, which would include the realized return rates, during the specifi c time horizon and the estimated VaR, and breaches should then be seeked, i.e. outliers. Dowd (2008) suggests that good practice is to supplement the backtesting diagram with a histogram of returns, which sometimes tends to provide a clearer indication of the empirical distribution of returns as well as the QQ diagram, which contains a quantile empirical distribution of returns against those predicted by return distribution. Furthermore, it also states that it is good to examine the socalled descriptive statistics of returns, including the statistics of mean value, variance, asymmetry, kurtosis, scope as well as the number and size of the extreme events.
Many fi nancial institutions use and implement various verifi cation models. For instance, the KPMG Advisory has implemented a backtesting process based on fi ve steps, shown in Figure 1 , in order to test the unconditioned coverage, independence and has developed appropriate solutions for possible model weaknesses (Muehlenbrock, 2011) .
As can be seen in Figure 1 , the fi rst step in implementation of the backtesting model is the graphic analysis and it provides an insight into the results and provides visual aid in revealing the problems. For example, in Figure 2 , the assessed VaR has been shown, changes in percentages in portfolio values and the number of outliers.
Th e second step is the so-called "traffi c light system" which is based on a binomial approach and which groups results into various categories, starting with the green (correct model) up to the red (rejected model) zone. Th e previously described measures of VaR validation should be supplemented in the following step, with certain statistical tests. Th is strategy, based on the modern statistical theory can reveal potential weaknesses of the applied VaR model. Th e fourth step refers to the backtesting report which sums the results and points to the possible weaknesses of the used methodology. Finally, the last step, based on the prepared report, KPMG is able to develop an adapted solution for possible problems, i.e. to assist in implementation of the improved VaR model.
OVERVI EW OF BACKTESTING PROCEDURES
VaR is by far the most popular portfolio risk measure, when it comes to risk management practice. Th e revolution of VaR in risk management has been initated when JP Morgan launched the RiskMetrics approach in 1994. Th e supervisors immediately recognized the urgent need for VaR validation methods and soon aft er, fi rst researches have been carried out on the risk model backtesting.
Many authors are concerned about the adequacy of the VaR measures, especially given the fact that they compare several alternative methods. Since the end of 1990s, various types of tests have been proposed for performance assessment of the VaR model. Papers, dealing with the comparison of the VaR methodology, most oft en use two alternative approaches: statistical test based on the testing paradigm of hypothesis and/or the loss function. In this paper we shall elaborate on the fi rst approach. As for this approach, several procedures based on the statistical testing of hypothesis, have been proposed in literature and the authors usually choose one or several tests for the performance assessment of VaR models and their comparison. Th e standard tests for the perforamnce assessment of VaR models are: 1) Basel approach, 2) unconditional and conditional coverage tests and 3) quantile dynamics test.
In order for all of these tests to be implemented, indicator function of VaR exceptions must be defi ned, the so call "hit sequence" (Christoff ersen, 2009).
(1) Th e negative prefi x which stands before VaR in the equation (1) is due to the fact that VaR is a positive number, according to the convention. In 1996, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has developed a backtesting framework, based on the number of outliers during the 250 daily observances, generated by VaR models of banks for the confi dence interval of 99%. Depending on the results, a supervisor may pronounce a penalty which would suit the increase in capital exposed to the market risk by a scaling factor. In order to support supervisors in interpretation of the backtesting results, the Basel Committe has introduced the so called "traffi c light" framework, which is related to a number of marked outliers (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1996):
1. Th e Green zone: between zero and four outliers. Th is is deemed to be an acceptable result of backtesting. Th ere is no concern in regard to this model which the bank is using and consequently, there is no penalty. 2. Th e Yellow zone: between fi ve and nine outliers. Th e supervisor shall attempt to fi nd out what has caused deviation from VaR and shall then decide whether a bank should be fi ned or not. 3. Th e Red zone: 10 or more outliers. Th is points to a major problem within a model and automatically generates a penalty, with an increase in the scaling factor by 1. According to the Basel Accord, backtesting of internal models is obtained directly from the testing of rates of failure, i.e. the number of outliers from VaR. In order to design one such test, we should fi rst choose the type 1 error rate, which represents the probability of rejecting a model, when it is actually correct. In such situations, the bank shall not be fi ned unjustifi ably and we could then be able to choose a test with a small error rate, type 1. However, should the bank decide so, the supervisory body making errors of type 2 as well, shall completely trick the VaR bank reporting. Th e current verification of the procedure comprises of the daily recording of outliers from VaR with a confi dence level of 99% in the last year. In such circumstances, a 1% of outliers is expected out of the 250 cases, i.e. 2.5 outliers during a year. In order to better understand the dilemma with which supervisory bodies are confronted, Table 1 provides error types I and II for various numbers of outliers from VaR, with a correct VaR model (i.e. with coverage of 99%) and incorrect models (i.e. with coverage rate of 97% or 95%). Th us, for example, if we were to have 5 or more outliers, the cummulative probability or the type 1 error rate, amounts to 10.8%. Th is represents a probability of fi ning a bank which has a correct VaR model, for no other reason than "bad luck". However, if we were to have 10 outliers, type 1 error rate would than fall down to 0% value.
In regard to type 2 error, Table 1 shows that the type 2 error rate by 5 outliers less, amounts to 12.8%. Th is represents a probability of not fi ning a bank which wilfully underestimates its risk. Th is not a very low probability. However, this probability reduces as the correct model deviates more and more from the target 99% of coverage. With 95% of coverage, the type 2 error rate is only 0.5%. Th erefore, it is quite probable that the supervisor would fail to notice a bank which signifi cantly underestimates its VaR.
Christoff ersen (1998) emphasizes that the problem of determining accuracy of the VaR model can most certainly be reduced to the problem of whether a "hit sequence" , fulfi lls two key characteristics, and these are the unconditional coverage and independence.
Th e test of unconditional coverage, which has been proposed by Kupiec (1995) enables testing so as to check whether the realized deviation rate from VaR, which represents the number of days when the loss was greater than VaR, divided by the size of the sample, is in line with the confi dence interval. If we were to expect for the losses which exceed the amount of the established VaR, to occur more oft en than α × 100% times, then this leads us to the conclusion that VaR measure systematically underestimates the portfolio risk. On the other hand, if we were to excpect deviations to occur rarely, this would perhaps be a signal that the VaR measure is perhaps too conservative. Although this test has remained until today as one of the reference tests in managing fi nancial risks, it nevertheless shows to a low statistical power, when used on a small data series, such as one-year period. As for independence property, it represents powerful limitation in regard to ways in which deviations from VaR can occur. More specifi cally, any of the two elements from the "hit sequence" (It+j(α), It+k(α)) must be independent from the other one. Th is sort of condition does not require for previous deviation from VaR {…, It-1(α), It(α)},to transfer any sort of information as to whether additional deviation from VaR will occur or not. If, for example, there is a greater probability of deviation from VaR happening upon previous deviation from VaR, then it implies that probability that It+1(α) = 1, having been conditioned by the event It(α) = 1, exceeds the amount of VaR, which further implies that the amount of VaR is to small and that it should be increased. It is important to understand that the features of unconditional coverage and independence of the "hit sequences" are mutually separated and diff erent and that they both need to be fulfi lled for the purpose of a precise VaR model. Mainly, a specifi c VaR model, in case of outliers in VaR, may fulfi ll either one or the other feature, but not both. Only the "hit sequences" which fulfi ll both of the stated properties can be deemed as relevant evidence of a precise VaR model (Christoff ersen, 1998) .
Christoff ersen (1998) has also developed a conditional coverage test, which represents an incorporated test of hypothesis of unconditional coverage and independence.
Christoff ersen and Pelletier (2004) have developed a backtesting approach of the VaR model based on duration. If VaR complies with the coverage rate p, it is then assumed that the hit sequence should be the Bernoulli i.i.d process with parameter p, and the duration between the outliers has no memory and that the mean value equals 1/p. Th e distribution of duration under null hypothesis is approximated by exponential distribution, given that it is only continuous distribution with a constant risk rate. For an alternative hypothesis, they have considered the Weibull's distribution with a decreasing risk rate. Th eir test can also be decomposed to a test of unconditional coverage and independence test, whereby the unconditional coverage test verifi es whether the mean value of duration equals 1/p, and the independence test verifi es whether the risk rate is constant. Th ey have also considered the autoagressive model for the expected conditional duration. It is also possible to defi ne a discreet distribution for duration. Haas (2005) believes that discreet distributions have a better power towards grouping of outliers from VaR, unlike the continuous distributions. Candelon, Colletaz, Hurlin, and Tokpavi (2011) suggest a new GMM test based on duration, for the purpose of VaR model validation. Th ey believe that discrete distributions act in the same way as continuous distributions, within the GMM approach. Berkovic, Christoff ersen and Pelletier (2011) have implemented a test of discrete distribution within the likelihood ratio test (LR test), which they called the geometric test. Under null hypothesis that duration has no memory, discrete duration follows geometric distribution. Th is is why it is called a geometric test. Monte Carlo simulation shows that the geometric test is the most powerful compared to the Weibull's test, which is based on continuous distribution. Engle and Manganelli (2004) claim that it is necessary for the hit sentence or rather the violations from the VaR assessment to have identical and independent distribution and insuffi cient requirement for proper VaR determination. If VaR prognosis is a valid measure of quantiles, the anticipation of outliers which depend on the set of information at the moment t-1 should be equal to the coverage rate. In other words, violation from VaR It shold be unbiased and should not be in correlation with any other information at the moment t-1. Th ey have suggested a dynamic quantile test(DQ) for the backtesting of the VaR model, which has proven to be very reliable and credible.Nowadays, it is an important tool for the verifi cation of the VaR model. Dumitrescu, Hurlin, and Fam (2012) have expanded this approach into a model of dynamic binary choice which enables non-linear dependance between deviation likelihood from VaR and explanatory variables.
Perignon and Smith (2008) have developed an innovative backtesting framework based on multidimensional VaR, which focuses on the left tail of distribution of the bank's incomes from trading activities. Th eir coverage test is a multivariate generalization of the Kupiec unconditional test (Kupiec, 1995) . Th ey have applied this new methodology of backtesting on actual bank data and have concluded that non-parametric GARCH VaR models and fi ltered historic simulation provide the best performance in market risk assessment. Danciulescu (2010) has proposed for backtesting to be based on multivariate of Ljung-Box statistics. Th e test considered autocorrelations and crosscorrelation between the outliers from VaR. Th e procedure encompasses the creation of a joint test for the properties of unconditional coverage and independence, using deviations from several business lines. Th e test is easily applicable and has shown improvement compared to the univariate procedures in the performance assessment of VaR. Colletaz et al. (2013) have developed a new method for the risk model validation, called, risk mapping (RM). Th is method calculates both the number and the size of the extreme losses and graphically sums all information on performances of the risk model. Based on the concept of super outliers, which is defi ned as a situation in which realized loss exceeds the amount of the standard VaR and VaR defi ned at an extremely low confi dence interval. Th e main advantage of RM lies in its simplicity and can therefore be applied as a standard technique for validation of the VaR model. In order to facilitate the implementation of this methodology, the authors have created a website which automatically generates RM.
1 Leccadito et al. (2014) have suggested innovative, multitests for the purpose of assessing the accuracy of the VaR forecasting. Tests are based on independence tests and conditional coverage. Th e fi rst test which has been proposed is the generalization of Markov test, which was proposed by Christoff ersen (1998) 
SUMMARY
Th e Bank and other fi nancial institutions have implemented numerous highly-sophisticated mathematical and statitstical techniques for managing market risks. One of the basic techniques among them is the VaR methodology, which has become an industrial and regulatory standard in measuring market risk over the past 15 years. In this paper, we have focused on the signifi cance of validation of the VaR model and we have presented the latest available, backtesting techniques. Th e tests diff er in details, but for the majority, the common characteristic is that they focus on a specifi c transformation of the assessed values of VaR and realized return rates. Th e back testing procedures presented herein can be deemed to be fi nal dignostics of the risk model, which the risk managers must implement or can be used by external supervisors. Th e banks should use the fi ndings of this paper as a starting point for validation of internal market risk models. Future researches shall be directed towards direct application and testing of the latest techniques of the risk model validation on the Serbian fi nancial market.
